

IM 70-70: Enemy Supply Losses
In Cambodia*

18 May 70 Maj Caulfield, DoD, to Kissinger memo re Impact on the Enemy of Ammunition Losses in Cambodia (response to Gen Haig's request for an estimate on enemy of captured ammunition in Cambodia and related information)

19 May 70 Distribution list for IM 70-70, Enemy Supply Losses in Cambodia

21 May 70 Moyer to Ch/D/I memo re Cambodian Losses to VC/NVA Forces (losses by FANK to VC/NVA for period 18 March to 19 May 1970)

21 May 70 Major Caulfield to Commander Howe (White House Situation Room) memo re Information on Cambodian Operations (info in tonnages of weight of enemy materiel and supplies captured in Cambodian operations as of 20 May)

22 May 70 D/OER to Ch/D/I memo re Appreciation (in recent study of enemy supply losses in Cambodia)

STAT 16 Jun 70 [] to Lt. Commander Howe, NSC, re The Weapons Component of Cambodian Stockpiles Estimates

Attachment: Blind Memo re Stockpiles of Weapons in Cambodia

STAT 2 Jul 70 [] to DCh/Production Staff, OCI, memo re DCI Fulbright Briefing

Attachment: DCI Briefing for Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Cambodia, 30 Jun 70

* IM 70-70 not in file.

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2 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Production Staff, OCI
SUBJECT: DCI Fulbright Briefing

1. The attached is a redo of the supply losses part of the Fulbright briefing. We have attempted where possible to comply with the DCI's suggestions.

2. The comparisons now parallel those made by the President. Mr. Helms should be aware, however, that the comparison on reequipping battalions with weapons, while arithmetically correct, is not sound. This is because about two-thirds of the weapons captured are either Free World weapons or old weapons of a type neither preferred nor being used by Communist forces.

3. We are unable to give locations of stockpiles in Laos or to quantify them. Nevertheless, our knowledge of logistic activities, enemy supply requirements, and the large stocks taken in Northern Laos and Cambodia convinces us that the stockpiles in Southern Laos are large.

4. Your suggestion to use the DIA input/throughput figures is unwise. There are so many problems with these figures that they are grossly misleading. Further, this Agency is on record that the data available will not support a quantification of supply movements through Laos.

[Redacted Signature Box]
Deputy Director
Economic Research

Attachment:
As stated.

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30 June 1970

DCI BRIEFING FOR SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

CAMBODIA

- I. The position of the Lon Nol government in the countryside continues to deteriorate in the face of increasing Communist military pressure.
 - A. The presence of the allied forces and the Communists' own logistic and command difficulties have prevented the Communists from making even more substantial gains at the expense of the badly outclassed Cambodian military forces. Since late March, for example, the Communists have attacked 15 out of 19 provincial capitals. They now occupy five of these key population centers. In the northeast--Stung Treng, Kratie, Lomphat, and Senmonorom, and in the west, Tbeng Meanchey.
 1. With the recent abandonment of two beleaguered outposts in Ratanakiri Province, the government's presence in the northeast region has been virtually eliminated.

2. There are indications that the Communists already are expanding their control over this zone. Elements of a North Vietnamese regiment have been conducting supply operations on the Se Kong River, which runs from the Laotian end of the Ho Chi Minh trail into the Mekong at the town of Stung Treng.

3. From Stung Treng, the Communists can use Route 19 to truck supplies eastward toward the South Vietnam border, and they can move supplies southward, along Route 13 and the Mekong, and westward along Route 231.

B. West of the Mekong, the Vietnamese Communists are making substantial inroads in the northern provinces of Preah Vihear, Oddar Meanchey, Kompong Thom and Siem Reap.

1. Sizable concentrations of Communist troops have been moving into Preah Vihear Province since mid-May, and they have isolated it by cutting the main road from the Laotian border to Kompong Thom city.

The government is pulling its forces out of Preah Vihear and Oddar Meanchey.

2. Kompong Thom city has been surrounded and attacked by the Communists for a month, but South Vietnamese air support enabled exhausted government defenders to hang on until reinforcements could be brought in. Elements of the Viet Cong 272nd or 275th regiments probably are involved in this fighting; the 275th took part in the capture of Kratie city in early May.
3. We have fresh evidence that elements of the Viet Cong 275th Regiment--which, captured documents indicate, has now organized a companion regiment bearing the same denomination, but composed of Cambodian Communists and local Vietnamese--are also involved in the fighting for Siem Reap city. The presence of the 275th and the forward element of the

Viet Cong's 5th Division, indicates that the Communists attach considerable importance to the Siem Reap effort. They presumably calculate that taking Siem Reap or the nearby Angkor Wat ruins--which at last report were in their hands--would deal a telling psychological blow to Phnom Penh, and Bangkok as well.

- C. In the eastern border province of Kompong Cham, enemy activity appears to be rising again.
 - 1. The province capital is defended by Khmer Krom forces--ethnic Cambodians who had been fighting under allied command in South Vietnam--but the presence of a substantial proportion of the Viet Cong 9th Division nearby indicates that another major assault could come soon.
- D. In the border provinces to the south and southeast, the Communists continue to attack

government positions and lines of communications.

1. Svay Rieng and Prey Veng cities are continually enemy harassed. Large concentrations of Communist forces roam Kandal Province, between the Mekong and Bassac rivers, frequently taking villages as close as 10 miles to Phnom Penh.

E. West of Phnom Penh, the Communists have attacked the capitals of Kompong Speu and Kompong Chhnang provinces.

1. Their continuing attack on Kompong Speu suggests that the Communists are determined to block Route 4, thereby severing Phnom Penh's main overland access to the seaport of Kompong Som--formerly Sihanoukville.
2. Enemy attacks in Kompong Chhnang probably also are directed at key lines of communications. Route 5, Phnom Penh's last remaining road link to the Thai border, has been harassed and the parallel rail line to Thailand is still cut in several places.

- II. Communist forces have moved around Cambodia almost at will, but they face some important obstacles.
- A. Not the least of these is the lack of support from a passive but essentially hostile population.
1. The Communists are trying hard to build a Cambodian Communist movement, but such work takes time. In addition, the Communists must also contend with the anti-Vietnamese sentiment of the average Cambodian villager.
- B. As they expand their operation areas, the Communist's freedom of action is likely to be inhibited by supply problems and the lack of well-established rear base areas.
- C. Up to now, the Communists have minimized these problems by avoiding major pitched battles, and by limiting the number of troops committed against the Cambodians.
1. Less than half their 11 main force infantry regiments now in Cambodia have been identified in action against targets in the Cambodian interior.

D. The Communists must also be concerned that--with time--the Cambodian Army may become a credible fighting force.

1. Despite a generally inept performance, there have been instances--especially in defending fixed positions--when the Cambodians have fought valiantly and well.

E. The Communists have detached large segments of territory from Phnom Penh's control and their actions have clearly had considerable psychological effect. Nonetheless, most Communist successes to date seem to have been recorded in situations where Cambodian Government defenders have put up only a minimal resistance. In almost every engagement where the Communists have had to contend with a serious counterforce--Cambodian, Khmer Krom, South Vietnamese or US--the Communists have given ground.

III. The government in Phnom Penh continues to function, despite the sharp military reverses.

- A. Prime Minister Lon Nol and his deputy Sirik Matak are shouldering much of the burden, with Lon Nol assuming responsibility for military affairs and Matak almost everything else.
1. Rumors of a serious rift between them have been circulating in the capital. Most of these are traceable to bickering among their subordinates. But Matak could decide at some time that Lon Nol's leadership is wanting.
- B. The loyalty of the army is crucial, and so far it has remained steadfast behind Lon Nol and the government.
1. The strains of the past several weeks have given rise to some grumbling, but as far as we can tell it has not reached serious proportions.
 2. Some junior officers in the air force, for example, have criticized Lon Nol for accepting offers of South Vietnamese and

Thai troop assistance without obtaining written assurances that the new allies will leave Cambodia when asked.

- C. Opposition has cropped up in the national assembly, one of the government's most important sources of support.
1. The assembly itself is divided, and each faction blames the government for different--and sometimes conflicting--deficiencies.
 2. One of the most basic problems is that many elements in the assembly and elsewhere hoped for a thorough house cleaning after Sihanouk's ouster. This has not been possible because Lon Nol depends on the old guard bureaucrats in the government and the army for his position, and because the war has pre-empted the time and energies of the top leadership.
- D. The economy is another major trouble spot for the Lon Nol government, as the fighting has brought economic activity to a virtual standstill.

1. Rail and road links radiating from Phnom Penh have been interdicted by Communist forces since early May. Exports of rice, Cambodia's most important earner of foreign exchange, have practically ceased. Rubber production has stopped; petroleum products are in short supply.
2. Government revenues, derived principally from customs duties and sales taxes, have declined while military expenditures soar. Inflation is a serious and growing threat.
3. These problems are not yet of critical proportions. Cambodia has a simple economy based on the farm or handicraft industries. Rice is plentiful in the countryside and in Phnom Penh.
4. Nonetheless, Cambodia lacks the material and financial resources to fight the Communists without substantial infusions of aid, both military and economic.

IV. Vietnamese Communist objectives in Cambodia remain open to speculation.

A. Hanoi clearly considers South Vietnam the main theater in Indochina, but the speed and scope of Communist military operations in Cambodia suggest that Hanoi may now wish to bring down the Lon Nol government.

1. It is becoming increasingly clear with each passing week that such a course would necessitate an all-out military operation in Cambodia, including a direct attack on Phnom Penh itself.
2. This would involve considerable political and military risks but Hanoi may believe that the risks are justified by the chance to undermine U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, intensify the anti-war sentiment in the United States, and increase pressures on Washington to negotiate on terms more acceptable to Hanoi.
3. It seems more likely, however, that the North Vietnamese will continue to do what

they have been doing for the past three months:

--one, solidify their control over the northeast, in effect turning it into an extension of the Laotian infiltration corridor


--two, take as much Cambodian territory as they can with a view to building a viable Cambodian Communist movement, but without using all the military resources at their disposal

--and three, keep up the pressure on Phnom Penh itself--perhaps even by rocketing the city or sending in a sapper battalion to create havoc--in the hope that the Cambodian generals will capitulate to Communist demands or that the government will collapse under the accumulated pressure.

B. Whatever the case, it appears certain that at a minimum the Vietnamese Communists want to maintain their position in Cambodia and keep on using Cambodian territory to support their war effort in South Vietnam.

C.

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2. The South Vietnamese have already indicated that they intend to be firemen in Cambodia, bailing out the Cambodians when they get in trouble.
 3. Even under the best of circumstances, however, Cambodia is in for a tough time, as events appear to be pushing the country

toward a Laos-like de facto partition

- V. In a broader sense, developments in Cambodia since last March have presented Hanoi with a whole new set of problems and opportunities in Indochina.
- A. The Communists have been set back in many ways, especially by the disruptive effects of allied operations during the past two months.
1. They suffered large supply losses, extensive casualties, disruptions of their supply routes, dispersal of their forces and their command and control apparatus, and the loss of immunity in sanctuaries and base areas astride the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.
- B. Between 30 April and 30 June, allied operations against Communist base areas have captured substantial stockpiles of supplies, including:
- over 7,000 tons of rice, or enough to feed 60,000 men for about five months.

--Over 22,900 individual weapons, 2,500 crew-served weapons, 14.8 million rounds of ammunition, and 143,000 rounds of rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle ammunition.

- C. These losses probably have placed further limits on the scale of action open to the Communists in the southern part of South Vietnam for some months.
1. Hanoi has long demonstrated, however, that it possesses a highly flexible logistics system, and has the capability to replace these losses through intensive effort.
 2. Rice losses can be made good from the excellent South Vietnamese harvest or from the bumper January crop in Cambodia.
 3. Over time, ammunition losses can be replaced from stockpiles in Laos, especially

after the rainy season ends this fall.

4. Furthermore, the Communists are continuing to move supplies southward through Laos this rainy season, whereas last year at this time the system was closed down.

VI. Even before their losses in the sanctuaries, the Communists recognized that events in Cambodia would impose additional burdens on them.

A. The evidence suggests that sometime in April the Politburo began to modify its strategy to fight a wider war in Indochina.

1. A recently captured document indicates that a new Vietnamese Communist party resolution may have been issued in that period.
2. A session of North Vietnam's National assembly was convened in early June, probably to put an official stamp on earlier decisions of the party leadership.

3. Now Vietnamese Communist diplomats from around the world are headed home for briefing on the revised party line.

B. The full scope of what the North Vietnamese intend to do next is not clear, but Hanoi's actions and statements suggest that it sees significant potential opportunities, as well as liabilities, in the new situation in Cambodia.

1. The speeches at the National Assembly session in Hanoi in June strongly suggested that the Communists have concluded that more hard fighting than they had anticipated earlier is now in prospect, and that this will require the use of more North Vietnamese troops.

a. There are some signs already that additional North Vietnamese regular combat units are being committed to the fighting in either southern Laos or northern South Vietnam.

VII. To date we have seen no major changes in Communist tactics in South Vietnam which can be traced

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directly to the allied moves into Cambodia.

- A. The diversion of substantial portions of the Communists' main force combat strength to the Cambodian theater, or at least away from South Vietnam itself, has reduced the threat to much of III and IV Corps.
- B. Their presence, however, is not essential to the kind of smaller unit actions on which the Communists have recently been relying.
- C. The Communists are determined to maintain a credible military stance in South Vietnam, but they are now conserving assets in the expectation that better political and military opportunities will come along as the US withdraws.
 - 1. In the meantime, through shellings, terrorism, and small unit action, the Communists have had some success in slowing down the progress of pacification programs and rebuilding their own apparatus to carry on the war over the long haul.
 - 2. Heavier enemy action is likely in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, where the Communists may seek to demonstrate

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their military power and attempt to force the South Vietnamese to divert troops to meet the threat.

- D. The lasting impact of Cambodian developments on Communist fortunes depends heavily on what the Communists, the US, and the South Vietnamese do in the future, not only in Cambodia but in South Vietnam as well.

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CIA Control No. 6896
16 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Comdr. Jonathan T. Howe
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT : The Weapons Component of Cambodian
Stockpiles Estimates

1. As you requested we have attempted to quantify the number of weapons included in our estimates of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia. We have found it impractical, if not impossible, to attempt to quantify specific weapons in the stockpiles and have settled on two categories -- of individual weapons and crew-served weapons. The available data and state of the art simply do not permit any greater precision. In fact the large number of variables in our data and our considerable uncertainties about the enemy stockpiles make it imperative that the figures presented below be understood simply as calculations and at this time certainly not be regarded as firm estimates. We are continuing to explore the problem in the hope of getting a better understanding of the impact of the enemy's weapon losses.

2. CIA estimates of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia of weapons and equipment (classes II and IV) include allowances for the following supplies:

a. Estimated enemy consumption of weapons in South Vietnam, including an allowance for replacing weapons because of normal wear, and re-equipping local enemy forces with more modern weapons.

b. Reported VC/NVA losses of weapons in South Vietnam which we assume the enemy must replace from stockpiles.

- c. Estimated consumption of other supplies
 -- quartermaster, signal, engineer, and so forth
 -- that the enemy must obtain from out of country
 (external) sources.

3. The weapons and equipment components of the total stockpile of these classes of supplies is given below in tons:

	<u>Low Estimate</u>	<u>High Estimate</u>
<u>Weapons and</u>		
<u>Equipment</u>	1600	2700
Weapons	565	950
Equipment	1035	1750

Weapons account for 35% of the estimated enemy stockpiles of weapons and equipment; the equipment component accounts for 65% of the total.


4. Assuming that the stockpiles in Cambodia consist of the same mix of individual and crew-served weapons as found in enemy units in South Vietnam, 565 tons and 950 tons of weapons are equivalent to the number of weapons shown below:

	<u>Low Estimate</u>	<u>High Estimate</u>
Tons	565	950
Individual		
Weapons	70,000	117,750
Crew-served		
Weapons	9,120	15,330

5. Through 14 June the Cambodian operations have picked up a reported 17,721 individual weapons and 2,330 crew-served weapons. These losses, when compared with stockpile estimates of the number of weapons in Cambodia, show that the Communists have lost from 15% to about 25% of their reserves of both individual and crew-served weapons (see tabulation below):

Enemy Losses of Weapons Compared to Stockpiles,
in Percent

	<u>Low Estimate</u>	<u>High Estimate</u>
Individual Weapons	25	15
Crew-served Weapons	25	15



Acting Director
Economic Research

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22 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Indochina Division, OER
Chief, Publications Staff, OER

SUBJECT : Appreciation

1. I want to take this opportunity to express the congratulations and appreciation of this Office for the splendid effort involved in completing the recent study on Enemy Supply Losses in Cambodia. This analysis was not only the most timely, complete and balanced study of the impact of enemy supply losses available in the community, but it was also one of the most enthusiastically received studies we have done in the past year. We have received expressions of appreciation and praise from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, from Dr. Kissinger's Staff and from the Department of State.

2. I know that a great number of people worked hard and put in many long hours in completing this assignment. They can all feel a great deal of personal satisfaction for their role in providing the highest levels of the government with a first-rate intelligence product. I would appreciate your passing this commendation along to each of the individuals involved. It will also be made a part of their official personnel folder.

EDWARD L. ALLEN
Director
Economic Research

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21 May 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, D/I

SUBJECT : Cambodian Losses to VC/NVA Forces

1. In response to a DIA/CIA request, the U. S. Defense Attache in Phnom Penh has obtained the following report of losses by FANK to VC/NVA forces for the period 18 March to 19 May 1970.

ARMS

- 1105 rifles
- 103 sub-machine guns
- 15 automatic rifles
- 21 machine guns
- 19 mortars
- 13 field guns
- 3 rocket launchers


AMMUNITION*

- 10,940 individual cartridges
- 10 cases of cartridges
- 8 cases of mortar rounds
- 2 cases of grenades

2. FANK reported capturing from VC/NVA forces the following material:

* Specific types unidentified; total weight probably less than 2 tons.

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~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

ARMS

- 1 mortar
- 4 rocket launchers
- 2 anti tank grenade launchers
- 3 U. S. carbines
- 23 rifles
- 9 automatic rifles
- 51 Chinese Communist sub-machine guns
- 1 machine gun

AMMUNITION*

- 100 mortar and artillery shells
- 111 grenades
- 1 mine

3. We have no way of knowing how complete the FANK report may be. For example, no reference was made to possible losses sustained when the VC/NVA overran the munitions storage facilities at Kratie.



Chief, Logistics Branch

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* Specific types unidentified; total weight less than 1 ton.

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IM 70-70, Enemy Supply Losses in Cambodia -

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